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Abstract 
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1. Introduction1
 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the relationship between labour market outcomes and family 
well-being. Specifically, we focus on the impact of job losses on family dissolution. The 
involuntary termination of employment usually leads to lower earnings and the stress created by the 
negative income shock can increase the probability of family dissolution. Moreover, a job 
displacement may signal individual traits that impact negatively on future earnings or on the quality 
of the match more generally. Again this suggests a positive relationship between family dissolution 
and job displacement. While policies aimed at reducing the earnings’ shock from job losses may 
alleviate stress on the couple in the case of the former effect, they will have less impact if the latter 
effect is the dominant one.  
 
In recent decades, family and marriage characteristics have dramatically changed; divorce rates 
have risen and marriage rates fallen. Fertility has declined, longevity increased and cohabitation has 
emerged as an important institution, often as a substitute for marriage. Economic models that 
explain why people marry and remain together have been developed in an attempt to explain these 
changes (Ermisch, 2003). The economic approach to marriage is based on the assumption that 
couples marry and stay married when the net gains from marriage are greater than those from 
remaining single. According to the traditional models of household economics, starting from Gary 
Becker’s Treatise on Family, these gains result mostly from gender specialization (especially when 
raising children) and sector-specific investments in human capital (Becker, 1974 and Becker 1991).  
 
Fundamental changes in the technology of household production and of birth control and increased 
female labour market participation have altered the returns to household specialization and, 
according to the traditional model, reduced the opportunity cost of marriage. More general models 
of household production have shifted attention away from specialization and the division of labour, 
to the benefits of joint consumption and a positive match between husbands’ and wives’ 
preferences (Lundberg, 2005 and Lam, 1988).  
 
The analysis of the relationship between job loss and family dissolution is particularly appropriate 
in this context. Given the increased complexity of the marriage relationship, individuals are likely 
to spend more time searching for a good match on the marriage market (Gould and Paserman, 
2003). We also expect partners to re-evaluate the benefits from an existing marriage more 
frequently. A husband’s involuntary job loss can lead to such a re-examination of the partnership as 
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it can affect both the contemporaneous value of the marriage (compared to its alternatives) and 
signal the likelihood of undesirable traits and lower future earnings.  
 
To fix ideas, consider a stylised model of marriage and divorce involving an initial match quality 
that is known at the time of marriage and the evolution of this match quality over time. Partners 
stay together if the match quality (including future expected benefits of the partnership) is high 
relative to outside options. The dynamic process underlying match quality will depend on various 
factors including choices made by the partners (e.g. having children) and state dependence whereby 
the match quality is causally affected by the duration of the match to date. Match quality will also 
depend on the occurrence of various shocks some of them having only contemporaneous effects 
while others generate more persistent impacts. A job loss can cause a contemporaneous shock in 
the loss of earnings and an increased stress on the union. It can also cause a more persistent effect if 
the earnings loss is long lasting or if the future expected match quality is revised. The latter will 
occur when the job loss is seen as a signal of lower future match benefits. This framework underlies 
the empirical approach adopted in the paper. 
 
It is important to understand the reason for the termination of the employment spell in order to 
evaluate what information this event may convey regarding the partner’s suitability. An involuntary 
and exogenous displacement causes an income shock, but does not convey new information about 
the partner’s characteristics. On the other hand, a “person-specific” dismissal is likely to be caused 
at least in part by the individual’s characteristics and behaviour. Papers studying the effects of 
layoffs on future earnings and probabilities of employment support these hypotheses. Job losses 
from plant closures (Gibbons and Katz, 1991; Doiron, 1995) or redundancies (Arulampalam, 2001) 
have a smaller effect on future earnings than other types of involuntary displacements. 
 
In this paper, data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) are used to analyse the effects 
of involuntary job losses experienced by the husband on the probability of marital dissolution. We 
take into account the length of the union and we estimate discrete time duration models. Individual 
and family characteristics are included and in some specifications, unobserved, time-invariant and 
match-specific random effects are modelled. The reasons for the termination of the employment 
spell are used to distinguish between different types of job losses: dismissals, redundancies and 
temporary job endings. While dismissals are more likely to be related to individual traits, 
redundancies are based on the employer’s characteristics and environment and are expected to 
represent effects of earnings shocks only.  
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According to the legal definition of redundancy in the UK, this type of job loss should be 
uninformative about the individual’s traits. The British legislation is quite explicit that the term 
redundancy should not refer to a dismissal caused by an individual worker’s behaviour. (We 
discuss the definition of redundancies more extensively in the data section.) Also, the distinction 
between types of displacements is supported by a recent study of the BHPS. Arulampalam (2001) 
finds that redundancies overall have less of a scarring effect; specifically, she finds that the 
earnings loss due to redundancies is about one half of that due to other displacements and 81% of 
men made redundant found jobs without any spell of non-employment. In another study of the 
BHPS, Borland et al (2000) compare the earnings loss of workers based on the reasons for the 
termination of the employment spell. They argue that the institutional system often blurs the 
distinction between the different categories and separate displaced workers from industries with 
decreasing employment in order to further reduce the potential bias from endogenous variations in 
job losses2
 
.  
A job loss that contains a signal of the individual’s characteristics is more likely to be correlated 
with unobservable components of match quality and lead to endogeneity bias. Furthermore, this 
bias is expected to be positive in the sense that it inflates effects of the job loss variables. Much of 
the empirical analysis conducted in the paper is designed to provide evidence on whether the 
different types of job loss impact differentially on the probability of divorce. The results all point to 
the treatment of redundancies as exogenous events in this context.  
 
There are very few papers looking at the effects of job losses on marital dissolution and to our 
knowledge only two of them take into account the reason for displacement. Furthermore these two 
papers find conflicting results. Charles and Stephens (2004) analyse US data and find that unlike 
layoffs, displacements due to plant closures have no significant effect on divorce3
 
. On the other 
hand, Eliason (2004) finds that factory closures in Sweden do lead to an increase in dissolutions. 
Our paper provides new evidence on this topic based on new data and models. 
Our empirical framework is closer to that of Charles and Stephens (2004) in the sense that we 
estimate duration models that account for marital longevity4. However there are also substantial 
differences between the approaches in the two papers. Our models are based on a proportional 
hazards framework and the resulting estimates are easier to interpret. We also estimate a variety of 
specifications of the hazard and look at selection into the stock and flow samples. Finally, 
cohabitations are included in the analysis.  
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Whether the displacement contains a signal of unfavourable individual traits or simply represents 
an earnings shock has several implications in the empirical analysis. For example, “person-
specific” dismissals are expected to have more severe and longer lasting impacts on divorce 
probabilities. This is in fact what we find. A redundancy experienced by the husband has positive 
but insignificant effects on the probability of family dissolution. The impact of dismissals is much 
higher - an increase of around 154% one year later - and statistically significant. (The average 
divorce rate for the sample is between 1 and 2% per year.) Effects of temporary job endings are 
generally located between the two. The addition of lags in the job loss variables does not change 
these overall results. Random effects specifications also yield similar results, an indication that our 
model of the baseline hazard is sufficiently flexible to capture the correlation caused by match-
specific unobservables across time.  
 
Using information on the workforce growth rate by industry, we separate job losses occurring in 
declining and growing industries. Displacements in declining industries are less likely to represent 
signals of unfavourable individual traits. Results differ considerably by type of job loss; 
redundancies from declining industries have a significant positive effect on the probability of 
divorce (a 100% increase one year later) while dismissals have a significant effect only in 
expanding industries (an increase of 161%). Again results are robust to semi parametric random 
effects specifications. These findings are consistent with the view of redundancies as capturing 
earnings shocks while dismissals contain signals of a bad match. Earnings shocks are more serious 
in declining industries given the difficulty of finding new and equivalent employment while 
unfavourable individual traits are more likely explanations of displacements in tight labour 
markets.  
 
Turning to other results, there is strong evidence of duration dependence in marital stability. In 
general, the longer people have been married, the smaller the probability of family dissolution. This 
result is reversed for the intermediate durations (10 to 20 years of marriage) where the probability 
of divorce is increasing with time ceteris paribus. The wife’s nonlabour income and age increase 
the probability of divorce as do large differences in the partner’s ages. Other regressors are 
generally individually insignificant. This is partly due to specification choices; we concentrate on 
the effects of job losses and adopt flexible specifications for all other variables.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The following Section provides an overview of the existing 
literature. Section 3 includes a description of the data construction and descriptive statistics. 
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Section 4 discusses the econometric model and Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally 
Section 6 contains concluding comments. 
 
2. Overview of existing literature 
 
We begin the section with a brief discussion of economic models of marriage and divorce. 
Although we focus on economic models, it is clear that economic considerations form but part of 
the picture and as stated by Weiss and Willis (1997): “A successful theory which is capable of 
explaining the data on marriage and divorce must incorporate ideas from sociology, biology and 
other fields”. Nonetheless, economic factors have been shown to play a significant role in the 
decisions to form and dissolve households. 
 
Becker’s seminal work (1974) forms the first economic framework of marriage and divorce. Two 
individuals marry when there is a positive surplus from their union relative to the two remaining 
single. As long as they are married, the two individuals maximise a joint expected utility function, 
whose arguments are the income or labour earnings received by each spouse (see Weiss, 2000 and 
Charles and Stephens, 2004 for more details). The couple divorces when the joint expected utility 
of being married is less than the sum of the individual expected utilities from divorce. The expected 
utility of divorce includes the probability of remarriage as well as the costs of divorce and the 
expected utility of remaining married includes the future option of divorce.  
 
Two general causes for marital instability and divorce are present in this model. First, although the 
search for a partner is costly, meetings do occur on a random basis. As a consequence, a union may 
become unacceptable if one of the two partners meets a person who would be superior to the 
current match. Second, people enter a marriage based on expectations about the match-quality 
which depends on the traits of the other spouse. These characteristics may change over time 
unexpectedly and cause the spouses to reconsider their initial decision (see Weiss and Willis, 1997 
and Boheim and Ermish, 2001). Thus “surprises”, such as unexpectedly high or low income, may 
affect marriage dissolution. According to Becker, Landes and Michael (1977), “the majority of 
divorces results from uncertainty and unfavourable outcomes”.  
 
A job loss may be considered as an economic “surprise” impacting negatively on the partner’s 
future expected earnings. It could also be a signal of characteristics (heretofore unknown) of the 
partner that affect his/her suitability as a mate such as reliability or sense of responsibility. Eliason 
(2004) underlines that the traits needed to keep a job are partly the same as the traits that make a 
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partner desirable. Hence a job loss may reveal new information about the match quality and lead to 
marital dissolution. 
 
An alternative theory of divorce is the family stress theory first elaborated by Hill (1949) and later 
by McCubbin and Patterson (1982)5
 
. A job displacement can be considered as a stressor event and 
have an impact on the family’s coping resources potentially leading to a crisis or a resolution. For 
example job loss is found to be correlated with alcohol abuse (Catalano et al, 1993) and domestic 
violence (Kyriacou at al, 1999). Game theoretic models of family bargaining offer alternatives to 
unitary models. In the “divorce threat models” bargaining power depends on the expected utility 
outside of marriage (Manser and Brown, 1980 and McElroy and Horney, 1981). In Lundberg and 
Pollak (1996), both partners behave noncooperatively and treat divorce as an outside option. 
Finally, in a recent study, Matouschek and Rasul (2004) develop stylised models of marriage as an 
exclusive contract. In a repeated games context, marriage can act as a commitment device that 
fosters cooperation.  
In all these models, job displacement plays a natural role in explaining marriage dissolution. 
Furthermore, several channels of transmission are expected. A job loss can be a stressor event, a 
signal of altered future earnings or more generally future match quality, an indication of shifts in 
household bargaining powers, the values of the outside option, and the degree of commitment to 
the marriage.    
 
We now turn to empirical studies analysing the effects of job losses. There is a well-established 
body of work showing the effects of job displacement on re-employment probabilities and future 
earnings. Displaced workers tend to experience reduced employment possibilities, increased job 
instability, as well as lower earnings’ profiles (Ruhm, 1991; Jacobsen, Lalonde and Sullivan, 1993; 
and Chan and Stevens, 2001). A growing number of studies consider the effects of job loss on the 
behaviour of other members of the family. For example Stephens (2001) analyses family 
consumption changes after the husband’s job loss; also Ercolani and Jenkins (1999) and Stephens 
(2004) focus on wives’ labour supply changes in response to the husband’s job loss6
 
.  
Changes in family labour supply and consumption form only part of the impact of job loss and the 
reduction in earnings. Recent work shows substantial impacts of unemployment on mental and 
physical health and well-being generally. There is a large empirical psychological literature7 
investigating the impact of unemployment on the incidence of low life satisfaction, depression, low 
self-esteem, unhappiness, and even suicide. The negative income shock is but one source of these 
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effects as employment is also a provider of social relationships, one’s identity in society and 
individual self esteem (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998). For example, a British study by 
Clark and Oswald (1994) shows that unemployed people have much lower levels of mental well 
being than those in work and Sullivan and von Watcher (2006) find a significant relationship 
between job loss and mortality8
 
.  
 The effect of job displacements on decisions regarding fertility and marriage forms yet another 
dimension of the impact of job loss. These non-pecuniary adjustments cannot be regarded as being 
of secondary importance; divorce is ranked as the second most stressful of life events following 
death of a family member (Miller and Rahe, 1997). Nevertheless, there is but limited research on 
this aspect of the costs of job displacements; furthermore, to date these papers provide inconsistent 
evidence. 
 
Jensen and Smith (1990) analyse Danish panel data and find significant effects of job losses on 
divorce but only for contemporaneous spells of unemployment. Job losses occurring one or two 
years earlier have no impact. These findings raise concerns that reverse causality may be driving 
findings of significant effects of job losses when the timing of events is not accounted for. 
Information regarding the length of the union is not used in this study.  
 
Weiss and Willis (1997) use US data from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School 
Class of 1972 to study the effects of earnings shocks on the probability of divorce. Shocks or 
“surprises” are defined as the difference between realized and predicted earnings estimated from 
earnings regressions. They show that a positive surprise to the husband’s earnings lowers the 
probability of marriage dissolution, while a positive shock in the wife’s earnings raises the chance 
of divorce. These results are robust to the inclusion of several controls for match quality. More 
recent studies use direct measures of earnings’ shocks. For example, based on the German Socio-
economic panel data, Kraft (2001) analyses the impact of unemployment on married couples’ 
decision to separate. The husband’s unemployment is found to increase the risk of separation in the 
following year and this impact increases with the duration of unemployment.  
 
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Charles and Stephens (2004) find an increase in the 
probability of divorce following a spouse’s job displacement in the first three years. In the last part 
of this paper, they compare different job losses and find a significant increase only for layoffs and 
not for plant closures. As Charles and Stephens (2004) state “This suggests that information 
conveyed about a partner’s non-economic suitability as a mate due to a job loss may be more 
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important than the financial losses in precipitating a divorce.” In contrast, Eliason (2004) finds a 
significant negative impact on the marriage’s stability in the long term (up to 13 years after the 
displacement) caused by the husband’s or the wife’s job displacement due to a factory closure in 
Sweden. 
 
Lastly, in an independent study to ours, Blekesaune (2008) finds a significant increase in the 
probability of family dissolution after any form of unemployment (experienced by husbands or 
wives). The paper is based on the BHPS and panel data techniques (random effects models) are 
used to control for unobserved heterogeneity. One major difference with our analysis is that 
Blekesaune does not distinguish between different causes of unemployment.  
 
3. Data construction and descriptive statistics 
 
The analysis uses data collected in the first 14 waves of the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS), which is a nationally representative sample recruited in September 1991. The survey 
contained approximately 10,000 persons (5,500 households) when it was constituted9
 
. The BHPS is 
an indefinite life panel survey and the longitudinal sample consists of members of original 
households and their natural descendants. If the original members split off from their household to 
form a new family, all the adult members (older than 16) of the new household are included in the 
survey and interviewed.  
In order to analyse the possible impact of job loss on family dissolution, we firstly construct a 
sample of all married or cohabitating couples in the BHPS. A dataset containing consolidated 
marital, cohabitation and fertility histories for the 29,065 adults interviewed at least once during the 
survey is available together with the original data (see Pronzato, 2007). This dataset provides the 
starting and end date of each union. If the union is a marriage, one or both partners can die, they 
can get divorced, separated or stay together. If the union is cohabitation, the partners can split, get 
married or they can continue cohabitating. In this analysis, we do not distinguish between 
marriages and cohabitations10. If the two partners cohabitate before marriage, we consider the 
cohabitation starting date as the union starting date. If there is a separation before the divorce, the 
date of separation is considered as the union end date11
 
.  
A divorce binary variable is defined to equal 1 when the end date from the family data set indicates 
a separation, a divorce or a split (for cohabitating partners) and when this is the last time the couple 
is observed being together in the survey. Usually, this can be easily confirmed by subsequent 
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observations in consecutives waves. A very small number of individuals12 disappear from the 
survey for one or more interviews when still married or cohabitating and re-appear with a different 
marital status (divorced or separated). For these couples, we assume they separate in the first year 
that they are not observed in the survey13. If a union ends, the partners are subsequently dropped 
from the analysis sample. Also, couples in which the man is younger than 16 or older than 65 years 
are dropped14
 
.  
The analysis sample includes second and later marriages. Also we include both flow and stock 
samples. The flow sample consists of marriages starting in 1991 or later while the stock sample 
includes unions in existence at the start of the survey period. Models that distinguish between these 
samples are estimated as part of the sensitivity analysis. Families formed before the beginning of 
the survey can have idiosyncratically higher levels of durability and represent better matches. A 
finding that job losses increase the probability of divorce even in families which are 
idiosyncratically stable forms a conservative lower bound for the population at large. 
 
Information on labour market behaviour and periods of unemployment is collected in different 
sources within the BHPS. At each interview, the individual is asked about his/her current 
employment situation15
 
, and whether he/she did any paid work or was away from a job in the week 
prior to the interview. Retrospective information about labour force behaviour and all employment 
spells over the previous year is also collected. G. Paull has compiled a special data set containing 
labour forces spells (defined in terms of spell state, start date and end date) for each individual after 
leaving fulltime education until the time of the interview (Halpin, 1997, Paull, 1997 and  Paul 
2002). This data set is complete for the first 11 waves of the BHPS and reconciles multiple sources 
of information on employment spells.  
The reason for the termination of an employment spell is not included in the Paull data set and was 
derived from the job history files. When providing the reason for leaving a job, individuals can 
choose among the following alternatives: promoted, left for better job, made redundant, dismissed 
or sacked, temporary job ended, took retirement, stopped for health reasons, left to have a baby, 
children/home care, care of other person, and other reasons. In this paper we focus on involuntary 
displacements and consider only dismissals, redundancies and temporary job endings as job losses.  
 
Also, only job losses experienced by the male partner are considered. There are a few reasons for 
this. In many households men are the primary earners and their job loss will cause the largest 
earnings shocks hence we are more likely to find impacts through that channel16. Secondly, female 
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labour market mobility is much greater and due to a variety of reasons (e.g. child bearing and 
rearing). Modelling these movements appropriately is complex. In the following we add a control 
for the wife’s employment status hence our results are conditional on the employment profile of the 
female partner. Our paper is a first step in a broader model of household behaviour that 
incorporates both male and female job losses.  
 
All involuntary job losses are expected to lead to negative shocks on earnings but dismissals are 
more likely to incorporate individual traits and act as signals for the future match quality. 
Temporary jobs are similar to dismissals in the sense that there may be an individual-specific 
reason for the non-renewal of the contract; but it is also possible that the end date of the job was 
fixed in advance (with no chance of renewal) in which case there is no signalling effect contained 
in the termination of the employment spell (although there may be in the acceptance of such jobs). 
The British redundancy law allows three reasons for redundancy: total cessation of the employer's 
business (whether permanently or temporarily), cessation of business at the employee’s workplace 
and reduction in the number of workers required to do a particular job. Moreover, the employment 
law clearly specifies that, in a redundancy situation, the employer should select workers fairly and 
should consider any alternatives to redundancy (this includes offering alternative work). Workers 
are eligible for redundancy payments after two years of tenure on the job.  
 
Despite its legal definition, redundancy can be used more generally as a term for involuntary 
separation and respondents may be willing to report redundancies in cases of dismissals17
 
. This will 
blur the distinction between dismissals and redundancies and inflate the effect of redundancies on 
marital dissolution. We follow Borland et al. (1999) and treat redundancies differently based on the 
industry of the job just ended. Specifically, data on industry-specific workforce growth rates are 
collected from published UK government statistics and a variable measuring a three year moving 
average growth rate for each industry is constructed. In some estimation models, job displacements 
are separated depending on whether they refer to jobs in industries with declining or growing 
employment.  
Appendix Table 1 lists the explanatory variables (other than job displacements) used in the 
empirical model. The choice of regressors follows the literature and includes human capital 
indicators, income, children, and similarities between partners. These variables measure variations 
in the utility of staying in the marriage, the value of the outside option, bargaining powers, and the 
quality of the match. Income is measured as household non labour income and includes pensions 
and other benefits, government transfers and investment income. The use of yearly income helps 
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smooth out effects of unusually high income receipt in any one month. Empirically, both yearly and 
monthly incomes produce very similar results. Nonlabour income is included separately for the 
wife and husband18
 
.  
Other variables included are: age of husband, age of wife, highest educational qualification attained 
(Degree, HND/A level, CSE/O level, No qualification), number of children in the household, a 
binary indicator of the wife’s employment status and two match quality characteristics. The 
economic literature related to marriage and divorce underlines the importance of “good matches”. 
Couples are characterised by their “match quality” at the start of the relationship and this is an 
important predictor of the future stability of their union. We include information about the 
difference in age of the partners (a dummy variable equal to one if the difference in age is greater 
than 8 years) and similarities in educational attainment (a dummy variable equal to one if the 
partners have the same education category) to capture variations in match quality across couples.  
 
For most models presented below the sample consists of 33463 observations involving 6134 
couples. In terms of potential divorces, this sample covers the period 1993 to 2005. The reason for 
the omission of 1991 and 1992 is as follows. All regressors are measured with a lag to prevent 
reverse causality and because we do not know the exact timing of the divorce during the year. For 
example, for someone who experienced a job loss between interviews in 1998 and 1999, we will 
associate the occurrence of divorce or the continuation of the union between the interviews in 1999 
and 2000. Hence, in the main sample, divorces can occur between 1993 and 2005 while the 
exogenous variables are measured over the period 1992 to 2004. Furthermore, in several models we 
include a second lag in the observed displacements (this is discussed below) so in these cases, the 
estimation data include occurrences of job losses over the years 1991 to 2004.  
 
Figure 1 displays the percentage rate of divorce/separation for couples who are in the analysis 
sample. The sample is divided into 2 groups: those couples who experience at least one job loss 
over the sample period and those who do not. From these raw numbers, we can see that on average 
between 1 and 2% of unions are dissolved by divorce or separation each year and the incidence of 
dissolutions trends slightly downwards over the length of the union. (Note that the average duration 
of unions increases over time even in the unbalanced sample.) In total, 512 dissolutions are 
observed in the sample. 
 
Insert figure 1 here 
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Table 1 presents the number of job losses by year in the analysis sample. In total, there are 1,413 
displacements consisting of 900 redundancies, 131 dismissals and 382 temporary job endings. If a 
husband experiences more than one type of job loss in any year, this information is used in the 
analysis19
 
. Generally, the incidence of displacements decreases over the 14 waves as the average 
age of the sample rises. Exceptions occur around the recession of 2000-01 especially for 
redundancies. In any one year, the incidence of job displacement is around 4 to 5%. This shows the 
importance of large samples when studying the topic.  
Figure 2 presents the distribution of length of marriages/cohabitations in the sample, by job loss 
experience. From the raw figures we see that marriages with no job loss experiences are shorter on 
average. This result is consistent with Charles and Stephens (2004) and would seem to contradict 
the theoretical predictions discussed above. However, these figures do not take into account other 
characteristics. Shorter marriages may have failed because of relatively bad match quality and since 
these observations do not remain in the sample of couples, they are less likely to appear in the 
sample that has experienced displacements. This illustrates the importance of controlling for 
characteristics of the union and in particular, state dependence in the effect of marital duration.  
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
Table 2 presents sample means of demographic and socio-economic variables among couples with 
and without job loss experience. Focussing on differences that are significantly different from zero, 
we find that the sample of couples where husbands do not experience any job loss over the sample 
period is slightly older (both partners), better educated (both partners) and the household nonlabour 
income is higher. This is consistent with a stereotypical view of those households where partners 
are relatively successful in the labour market and hold more secure jobs. Having the same 
education level is more common in the sample of couples without any job loss, an indication of 
better match quality. The table includes the divorce rate by sub-groups for the two samples. In 
general, couples with a job loss experience also have higher divorce rates but most differences 
between divorce rates by sub-groups are not significant. The highest divorce rates are found for 
partners who are young and who have middle to low educational qualifications. 
 
4. Estimation methods  
 
We estimate a discrete time proportional hazards model, to investigate the effect of job loss on the 
probability of a marital dissolution during time interval (t, t+1), given that the partnership has 
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survived until time t. A discrete time representation of the continuous time proportional hazards 
model is given by: 
 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = Pr[𝑡 < 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 + 1|𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡,𝛽′𝑋𝑖(𝑡),𝛾(𝑡),𝛼𝑖] 
           = 1 − exp[−exp{𝛽′𝑋𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛾(𝑡) + 𝛼𝑖}]                                           (1) 
where t denotes time in the union, hi(t) is the hazard at time t for couple i (the dependence on X 
and estimation parameters is suppressed), Xi(t) is a vector of covariates that potentially vary across 
unions and time, β is a vector of coefficients common across time and unions, Ti is a discrete 
random variable representing the time at which the union ends, γ(t) is the log of the integral of the 
underlying continuous time baseline hazard between t and t+1. Variables and parameters are 
assumed constant between t and t+1 for all t. We have made the usual assumption of common 
effects of the covariates across unions; unobserved individual heterogeneity in the hazard model 
takes the form of intercept shifts through the vector α which is further specified below. Finally, the 
complementary log-log form of the hazard is implied by the underlying continuous time 
proportional hazards specification.  
 
To take into account censoring, the sample log-likelihood function of the observed duration data is 
written with the aid of a dummy variable cit equal to 1 if  𝑡 < 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 + 1  and the marriage is non-
censored (a divorce is observed during the time interval (t, t+1)) and cit = 0 otherwise (the marriage 
continues on to the next interval or is censored). The log-likelihood function can be written as: 
 
ln 𝐿 = ∑ ∑ [𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑡=𝜏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ln(ℎ𝑖 (𝑡)) + (1 − 𝑐𝑖𝑡 ) ln(1 − ℎ𝑖 (𝑡))]                                                         (2) 
 
 
where N denotes the number of couples in the sample, T is the maximum marital duration observed 
in the sample, and τi equals 1 for the flow sample and the duration of the ith union in 1992 for the 
stock sample (constructed using the starting date of the union). Independence between 𝑇𝑖 and cit  
conditional on Xi(t) is a maintained assumption20
 
 (see Wooldridge, 2002, page 708).   
The main issues in specifying this model revolve around the form of the baseline hazard and the 
presence and form of couple-specific, time-invariant and unobserved effects denoted as α in (1). 
These components of the model represent the systematic evolution of relationships over time (over 
and above that captured by the covariates) and the presence of unobserved match quality 
respectively. We adopt a flexible baseline that takes the form of a set of dummies γ(?̃?) equal to 1 if 
the observation is in time interval ?̃? and 0 otherwise. Ideally a full set of dummy variables (one for 
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each year covered in the sample) would be used. However due to small number of observations, we 
group dummies over the following year intervals: (0 − 1, 2 − 4, 5 − 6, 7 − 10, 11 − 15, 16 −
20, 21 − 25, 26 − 30, 30+). As seen below the individual dummies are mostly insignificant with 
this many categories (they are usually jointly significant), but since we do not care about the 
individual coefficients we do not group them into coarser durations. An overly restrictive baseline 
hazard will not fully take into account correlations in unobservables across time and lead to 
inefficient estimates. As discussed next, we check for this with alternative approaches.  
 
In the simplest models presented below, there are no couple-specific time-invariant unobserved 
effects. It is well known that ignoring unobserved match-specific and time-invariant heterogeneity 
will cause the overestimation of negative duration dependence since it then becomes the only form 
of correlation over time in the model (other than that present in the covariates). However, since this 
study focuses on the effects of job displacements on the duration of marriage, the distinction 
between duration dependence (the shape of the baseline hazard) and unobserved heterogeneity is 
secondary. Separating out unobserved heterogeneity from duration dependence does not change the 
effects of the covariates on the mean duration (see Wooldridge, 2002, page 706). In other words, 
the specification of a flexible baseline hazard capturing both duration dependence and unobserved 
heterogeneity works just as well for our purposes. Nevertheless, models with flexible couple-
specific time-invariant effects are useful as a specification check and we use the robustness of our 
results as an indication of how well the baseline hazard is specified.  
 
In the models with time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, random effects independent of the 
covariates and the censoring times are assumed21. In the most flexible specifications, we use a 
semi-parametric distribution based on the work of Heckman and Singer (1984) and Meyer (1990)22
ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = 1 − exp[−exp{𝑥𝑖(𝑡)′𝛽(𝑡) +  𝛾(𝑡) + ln(𝜀𝑖)}]    (3) 
. 
Specifically the unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be multiplicative in the hazard rate 
specification: 
 
where εi has a discrete distribution with a small number of mass points. The models with 
unobserved heterogeneity shown below are estimated under the assumption of 2 mass points (a 
model with 3 mass points is also estimated as a robustness check). An alternative model with 
normally distributed random effects is also estimated and the results are qualitatively and 
quantitatively very similar to those using the discrete distribution. More details are provided below. 
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Generally, flow samples are drawn from a population of short spells since their duration is limited 
by the survey period (in our case 1991-2005). On the other hand, long spells are overly represented 
in stock samples since spells that began and ended before the first interview are excluded. This is 
the problem of length-biased sampling. In our analysis sample, these two subsamples are fairly 
evenly divided: the stock sample contains 18279 observations (with 222 divorces and 697 job 
losses) while the flow sample numbers 15184 (with 290 dissolutions and 716 job losses). In order 
to check that the specification of the hazard (in particular the baseline hazard) is sufficiently 
general to represent the non-random selection between stock and flow samples, we estimate models 
that distinguish between the subsamples. Results are summarized below. 
 
It is helpful to relate the econometric framework to a stylized marriage model where individuals 
decide to stay married as long as the value of the match surpasses the outside option. Let q0i denote 
the match quality at the time of marriage for couple i; q0i captures the partners’ knowledge of their 
and their partner’s personality traits as well as their expectations regarding the future. The match 
quality will evolve over time depending on choices (e.g. the decision to have children) and shocks 
(e.g. involuntary job losses). Let qti represent the match quality at time t, then we can write qti = 
f(q0i, q1i, ..., qt-1i, eti) where eti represents the innovation to match quality at time t. Similarly, the 
outside option to the partnership, say zti, evolves over time depending on observable and 
unobservable factors. A divorce will occur when qti - zti < 0. The probability of divorce at time t for 
existing marriages -the hazard rate- is a function of match quality relative to outside options and 
this in turn is dependent on the initial values and the innovations over time.  
 
In the econometric framework explained above, the baseline hazard captures the evolution of the 
match quality over time (relative to outside options) that is systematic across couples. The time-
invariant unobserved random effects capture the distribution of initial match quality (relative to 
outside options) across couples and the explanatory variables measure the effects of couple and 
time specific observables on the match quality relative to outside options.  
 
As mentioned above our specification of the hazard links the probability of dissolution during a 
time period t with control variables measured at t-1. We also include additional lagged observations 
of job losses. This can be motivated as follows. Consider a person-specific dismissal. This event 
implies a negative shock in earnings and a reduction in the value of the marriage. It also may signal 
a shift in the perceived characteristics of the partner and a further reduction in the value of the 
marriage. If this effect is only felt for a short time then including the one-period lagged dismissal is 
sufficient. If the job loss implies a permanent drop in earnings or a permanent revision in the value 
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of the match then the job loss will permanently alter the probability of divorce. This means that all 
past job losses should also be included in the specification of the divorce probability. Effects of job 
losses that fade relatively quickly would require the inclusion of a few lags only. We experiment 
with various specifications of the lagged job loss variables. Note that if, as expected, redundancies 
do not convey signals regarding the partner’s traits, the impacts from longer lags in these 
displacements should be small relative to other forms of displacements as they represent effects 
caused by earnings losses only.  
 
Taking into account the relative timing of the events does not necessarily control for all sources of 
endogeneity of the job losses with respect to the probability of divorce. The issue arises because of 
imperfect measurement of the match quality at the time of the job loss. In the context of our 
duration model, any variation across couples in unobserved traits that are time invariant or that 
evolve systematically over the length of the marriage will be controlled for by the couple-specific 
effects and the baseline hazard. There remains the possibility of an unobserved, match-specific and 
time-varying trait which is correlated with the occurrence of a job displacement. Consider a 
particular worker who is chosen for dismissal because he has a particular character trait. If this 
character trait is correlated with an unobserved component of the match quality (e.g. the trait 
matters more because the match quality is poor relative to other similar couples and relative to 
previous values of the match quality for this couple) then we will incorrectly attribute some of the 
effect of the match quality to the job loss.  
 
The possibility that a job loss captures both an income effect and a signal of an unfavourable 
character trait does not necessarily lead to a problem for the causal interpretation of the impact of 
job loss. The problem arises only when this character trait is correlated with omitted factors such as 
unobserved match quality components. A job loss that doesn’t depend on the worker’s traits will 
not pose this problem and our evidence suggests that this is the case for redundancies. As a 
robustness check, we also estimate models excluding job losses other than redundancies in order to 
see if the impact of redundancies remains stable after the omission of the possibly endogenous 
dismissals and temporary job endings. 
 
5. Results  
 
In the estimation models presented below, the explanatory variables are measured at t-1 for divorce 
risks at time t except where explicitly indicated. Estimates are presented in the relative risk format 
(exp(β)); for an element of the coefficient vector β, say βk, these represent proportional changes in 
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the hazard due to the change of Xk from 0 to 1 in the case of a discrete variable or the addition of 1 
unit to Xk if Xk is continuous. Standard errors are appropriately transformed. Generally, we present 
standard errors that are robust and clustered by couple so that inferences are valid in the context of 
a quasi-maximum likelihood framework where the standard distributional assumptions do not hold. 
In the models with random effects, we present the usual standard errors. (In practise the robust and 
clustered standard errors are very similar to the unadjusted ones, an indication that our specification 
is sufficiently flexible in capturing correlations in durations across time.) 
 
In Table 3 we present results on the job loss variables for a variety of specifications. (Results 
concerning other regressors are presented below.) In the left-most column of results, the model 
includes one job loss variable representing the incidence of (at least) one involuntary displacement: 
either a dismissal, a redundancy or a temporary job ending. The effect is large; the probability of 
divorce increases by 87% the following year. The average probability of divorce in any one year is 
around 1 to 2% hence a job loss would raise this to about 3% on average for the sample. There is 
evidence that the effect persists; with two lags, the probability of divorce is increased by 66% the 
following year and 52% two years later. These are individually and jointly significant at the 1% 
level.  
 
The middle column shows the effects on dissolution of job losses separately for the different types 
of displacements. Losing one’s job due to a dismissal has the highest effect on divorce: the 
probability is increased by 154% one year later in the model with one lag. A job loss due to 
redundancy has the smallest effect (39%) and it is not statistically significant. The effect of 
temporary job endings is in between the two, and statistically significant. In the model with two 
lags the coefficients on the redundancy variables are individually and jointly statistically 
insignificant. Although positive, they are also quantitatively much smaller than those on other job 
loss variables. For dismissals, only the effect of the first lag is statistically significant and it is 
comparable to that found in the model that includes one lag only. Both dismissals and redundancies 
have effects that taper off with time but this is not the case with temporary job endings. For this 
reason we estimate a model with three lags in the job loss variables23. In this case the coefficients 
on temporary job endings fall as the lag increases and the coefficient on the third lag is individually 
insignificant with a p-value of 0.84124. (Results on the model with three lags are available upon 
request.) Long term dynamic effects of job loss cannot be detected in these models25
 
.  
The right-most columns correspond to a model where job loss variables are interacted with industry 
group dummies. Industries are grouped based on whether a three year moving average workforce 
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growth rate is negative or positive and displacements from jobs in industries with declining 
employment are treated separately from those located in growing industries. We expect that a 
displacement in a declining industry will not include the same signalling content as an involuntary 
job loss in a growing industry simply based on the probability of the event occurring.  
 
The results for redundancies are again markedly different than for other job losses. The impact of 
redundancies is larger and is significant in the declining industries. For the other job losses the 
effects are also substantially larger and significant but only for the expanding industries (with the 
exception of the second lag in the temporary job ending variable that is significant in both industry 
groups). The probability of divorce is doubled for a couple in which the husband experienced a 
redundancy from a declining industry while the probability is increased by over 160% when the 
husband experienced a dismissal from an expanding industry. 
 
In Table 4 we present results for semi-parametric models with random effects distributed discretely 
with two mass points26
 
. (Models with normally distributed random effects yield very similar results 
with coefficients generally differing at the second decimal point. These are available from the 
authors.) The effects of this specification change on the estimated coefficients are marginal. 
Without the industry group interactions, the only important change is that the dismissal dummy 
lagged twice becomes marginally significant. With industry interactions, the temporary job endings 
variable lagged twice becomes insignificant in declining industries. None of the general 
conclusions regarding the job loss variables are altered. We can interpret this as an indication that 
our model of the baseline hazard is flexible enough to capture most of the correlation across time in 
unobservables.  
Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with the interpretations discussed above; that is, 
redundancies represent mostly negative earnings shocks and hence the effects are smaller and more 
short-lived. Dismissals are expected to have a larger signalling content regarding the future match 
quality and hence a greater impact on the probability of dissolutions. Also since they capture 
mostly the effects of negative earnings shocks, redundancies have worse effects in declining 
industries compared to expanding industries given the difficulty of finding new and equivalent 
employment in these sectors. The fact that dismissals and temporary job endings have more 
substantial effects in expanding industries is also consistent with a signalling role for these 
displacements; that is, unfavourable traits are more likely explanations of displacements in tight 
labour markets. 
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Results with respect to other regressors for selected specifications are presented in Table 5. We 
note that these estimates are similar across the columns and are generally insensitive to the specific 
form used for the job loss variables. There are greater changes when random effects are added to 
the model but qualitative results are unaffected. We find positive and significant effects from the 
non labour income of the wife. The wife’s age shifts the hazard down while the dummy capturing a 
difference in age between partners greater than 8 shifts the hazard up. Increasing both partners’ age 
by one year shifts the hazard down (the exponential of the sum of the coefficients is 0.923) an 
indication of greater marital stability with the age of the partners (note that this is over and above 
the effects of the duration of the marriage). Shifts in education are insignificant in these models as 
well as similarity of education across partners27
 
.  It is interesting that in the British data we find no 
significant effects of the number of children on the probability of divorce. In contrast, Charles and 
Stephens (2004) found a negative effect of children on the probability of divorce in US data. The 
baseline hazard dummies are generally individually insignificant although jointly they are 
significant at a 5% level in all specification. (We discuss the shape of the baseline hazard further 
below.)  
Given our interpretation of dismissals and temporary job endings as capturing signals of 
unfavourable traits, the question arises as to the possible endogeneity of these job loss variables. As 
discussed above, if the trait being signalled is correlated with the match quality and if match quality 
is imperfectly controlled for, then an endogeneity bias will result. Furthermore, we would expect 
the bias to be positive in the sense that the strength of a signal of an unfavourable trait is likely to 
be negatively correlated with match quality and hence increase the likelihood of divorce. In other 
words the bias would increase the estimated impact of the job loss variables.  Since the inclusion of 
endogenous variables potentially biases all coefficients, we also estimate models where both 
dismissals and temporary job endings have been omitted. The effects of redundancies are slightly 
increased quantitatively, an indication of a slight correlation across types of job losses, but none of 
our overall conclusions regarding the effects of redundancies are affected. (Results are available 
upon request.) 
 
Figure 3 plots the empirical hazard by year of marriage along with a predicted hazard. The 
prediction is derived from the model with two lags and interactions with industry types although 
the graph looks very similar across the various specifications. We see that the fit of the model is 
quite good throughout the whole distribution of marriage length. Without controlling for sample 
characteristics, the hazard is seen to decline over marital duration with a slight hump occurring 
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around 7 to 19 years of marriage. (For durations over 30 years, the numbers are too small to detect 
any trend). 
 
Insert figure 3 here 
 
Figure 4 plots the baseline hazard for the same specification. The hazard is normalised to zero for 
the reference duration segment (2 to 4 years). (Note that these values correspond to the unadjusted 
coefficients while the results in the tables are presented in the relative risk format.) The risk of 
divorce decreases over the first 7 to 10 years of marriage. This is followed by a sharp increase and a 
flattening out at around 20 years. The risk of divorce declines after 25 years of marriage. 
Individually, only the coefficient corresponding to the 16 to 20 years duration is significantly 
different from zero although compared to the lowest risk at 7 to 10 years, the coefficients for the 
durations 11 to 15, 16 to 20, and 21 to 25 are all individually significant. So is the coefficient for 
the shortest durations of 0 to 1 years of marriage. The shape of the baseline suggests that 
controlling for sample characteristics, the hump in the probability of divorce is sharper and occurs 
later in the duration of the marriage than what is suggested by the unadjusted hazards. 
 
Insert figure 4 here 
 
Additional sensitivity analysis is described briefly in what follows. Detailed results are not 
presented to save on space but are available upon request. We estimate models that include 
interactions of displacements with recessionary years (2000-2001) on the grounds that these job 
losses are less likely to convey any information on the partner’s traits. In general, the results 
support our overall conclusions; however, we have small numbers of events (job losses during 
recessionary years) and standard errors are large. Similar conclusions are reached with models that 
include job losses after a marital dissolution as instruments.  
 
Models in which coefficients are allowed to shift depending on whether the couple is part of the 
stock or flow sample are estimated. As explained previously, we expect idiosyncratically long 
(short) matches to form part of the stock (flow) sample. Specifically, variables are interacted with a 
flow sample dummy.28 The results involving the job loss variables described previously still hold 
for the stock sample (the reference group) and with one exception, the interactions between the job 
loss  variables and the flow dummy are individually and jointly insignificant. The exception to this 
is the interaction with the twice lagged temporary job ending that is marginally significant at 10%. 
In contrast, the interactions involving variables other than the job loss variables are strongly jointly 
 22 
significant. Also, the baseline hazard becomes flatter in these specifications as the flow dummy 
now captures some of the duration effects. But as far as displacements are concerned, the overall 
results presented above hold for both stock and flow subsamples. 
 
The final robustness analysis incorporates self-reported satisfaction with one’s partner as a direct 
measure of the match quality. Job displacements that are exogenous will not depend on the match 
quality of the union. Regressions with job loss as the dependent variable and lagged satisfaction 
variables as regressors are estimated. Unfortunately the satisfaction information is only available 
starting in wave F (1996) of the BHPS and the sample size is substantially reduced. Nevertheless, 
our results support the treatment of redundancies as exogenous in the sense that the satisfaction 
measures do not help explain the incidence of job loss in the next period in the case of redundancies 
in any of the models estimated. In contrast, the effects on temporary job endings and dismissals are 
significant in some specifications. (Results are not shown to save on space but are available upon 
request.) We are unaware of previous economic studies making use of satisfaction with one’s 
partner in the context of the analysis of divorce risk and we believe this type of information to be a 
promising avenue of future research.  
 
6. Conclusion   
 
In this paper we have examined the effects of involuntary job loss on partnership dissolution, a 
topic that is particularly relevant in the current economic climate. Data from the British Household 
Panel Survey are used in the study. We distinguish between different types of displacements 
(dismissal, redundancy and temporary job ending) and we analyze their impacts on the probability 
of divorce in the year following the job displacement. In general, job losses raise the probability of 
divorce and these effects are stronger for dismissals and temporary job endings.  
 
The evidence presented in the various specifications support the hypothesis that job losses that are 
likely to depend on the worker’s characteristics contain signals of future match quality and hence 
have a more important impact on the probability of match dissolution. Redundancies are dependent 
on the employer’s characteristics and represent mainly earnings or psychological shocks. Their 
impacts are smaller, shorter-term and have more influence in bad economic situations when the 
earnings shock is expected to be more serious. The effects of redundancies are statistically 
significant in a few of the models (for example if they occur in declining industries) but are usually 
insignificant. In this sense, our results support those of Charles and Stephens (2004).  
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This analysis could be expanded in several directions. The analysis of the impacts of the wife’s job 
loss is an obvious and interesting extension. Also, the role of social supports could be incorporated 
by distinguishing the impact of job loss in high unemployment areas. Finally, the role of 
expectations on job changes can be investigated using information on the worker’s opinion 
regarding his/her job security29
 
. Individuals who expect to lose their jobs may be paid 
compensating wage differentials and these may partially protect the families from high distress and 
other negative outcomes. On the other hand, they may make the negative earnings’ shock more 
severe. The information on expectations currently available in the BHPS does not allow the 
separation of voluntary job changes and hence could not be incorporated in this paper. 
The finding of significant effects of job losses on the probability of divorce has important 
consequences for the econometric modelling of the impacts of displacements on families generally. 
Studies of the effect of job loss on family consumption or labour supply that only consider couples 
who remain married will produce biased results since the couples who remain together are those 
who had to face the fewest adjustments as a consequence of the loss of employment. Excluding 
divorced couples is likely to lead to an underestimate of the impact of job displacements.  
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Figure 1 – Divorce rate by year, analysis sample 
 
 
The sample contains 33463 observations involving 6137 couples. Divorce includes separation. 
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Figure 2 – Distribution of years of marriage, analysis sample 
  
The sample contains 33463 observations involving 6137 couples. Marriage includes cohabitation. 
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Figure 3 – Observed and predicted hazards by duration of marriage 
 
The predicted probability of divorce is generated from the model presented in the right-most columns 
of Table 3.  
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Figure 4 – Baseline hazard  
 
The predicted probability of divorce is generated from the model presented in the right-most columns 
of Table 3.  
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Table 1- Involuntary job displacements by year and type 
 Dismissals Redundancies Temporary job endings 
Year No. % of 
total 
% of 
couples No. 
% of 
total 
% of 
couples No. 
% of 
total 
% of 
couples 
1992 6 4.58 0.28 88 9.78 4.12 20 5.24 0.94 
1993 11 8.40 0.54 99 11.00 4.82 32 8.38 1.56 
1994 13 9.92 0.63 80 8.89 3.88 34 8.90 1.65 
1995 8 6.11 0.40 57 6.33 2.82 26 6.81 1.29 
1996 13 9.92 0.61 61 6.78 2.88 28 7.33 1.32 
1997 10 7.63 0.48 54 6.00 2.58 24 6.28 1.15 
1998 11 8.40 0.47 43 4.78 1.83 38 9.95 1.62 
1999 12 9.16 0.56 56 6.22 2.63 28 7.33 1.32 
2000 10 7.63 0.40 67 7.44 2.67 42 10.99 1.68 
2001 21 16.03 0.53 166 18.44 4.23 68 17.80 1.73 
2002 11 8.40 0.34 52 5.78 1.62 22 5.76 0.68 
2003 3 2.29 0.08 45 5.00 1.25 13 3.40 0.36 
2004 2 1.53 0.06 32 3.55 0.98 7 1.83 0.22 
Total 131 100.0 0.39 900 100.0 2.69 382 100.0 1.14 
The sample size is 33463. See the main text for definitions of the types of displacements. % of couples is 
the proportion of job losses relative to the number of couples in the analysis sample in the year in 
question. For the total, the % of couples refers to the proportion of displacements in the total number of 
observations. 
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Table 2 - Means of socio-economic variables and divorce rates by job loss samples. (33463 obs.) 
  Job loss sample No job loss sample 
 Sample mean  Divorce rate  Sample mean  Divorce rate  
Men - Education     
High degree* 11.59† 1.78 15.13 1.24 
HND/A level 43.21 1.78 42.21 1.48 
CSE/O level 21.30 2.32 21.25 2.10 
No qualification 23.90† 1.21 21.41 0.96 
          - Age      
18-30 14.75 3.82 14.15 3.94 
31-40 29.12 2.31† 29.17 1.58 
41-55 39.27† 1.02 37.69 0.99 
56-65 16.86 0.73 18.99 0.38 
Mean age in years 43.20†  43.64  
Women - Education     
High degree* 9.41† 1.61 12.87 1.31 
HND/A level 32.79† 1.80 36.05 1.64 
CSE/O level 34.14† 2.21 30.68 1.69 
No qualification 23.65† 1.10 20.40 0.92 
           - Age      
18-30 20.09 3.56 19.28 3.51 
31-40 29.96 2.06 30.42 1.52 
41-55 38.85† 1.06 36.42 0.80 
56-65 11.09† 0.12 13.90 0.27 
Mean age in years 41.06†  41.58  
              - Work status     
In paid employment or self employed 67.72 1.60 68.00 1.50 
Unemployed, retired, family care, other* 32.28 2.09† 32.00 1.40 
Household non labour income     
0-1,000  34.35 1.36 34.80 1.75 
1,001-5,000 41.02† 1.87 38.57 1.48 
>5,000 24.63† 2.12† 26.63 1.09 
Mean income in £ (base year=2005) 3791.50†  4307.17  
Number of children 0.90  0.88  
Couples with children 46.76 2.35† 45.61 1.70 
Couples without children 53.24 1.24 54.29 1.27 
Partners have same education levels     
Yes 40.67† 1.86 44.23 1.37 
No 59.33† 1.54 55.77 1.69 
Difference in partners’ age >= 8 years     
Yes 8.81 3.12 9.31 2.01 
No 91.19 1.63 90.69 1.41 
The number of observations is 7276 for the job loss sample and 26187 for the no job loss sample. All 
figures are percentages unless otherwise indicated. * denotes an omitted group in regressions. † 
denotes that the difference in the statistics from the job loss and no job loss samples is significantly 
different from zero based on a two-tailed test and a 5% level of significance. See Appendix Table 1 and 
the main text for more details on the variables. For age, income and number of children, only the 
continuous variable is included in the estimation models. 
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Table 3 – Effects of job loss on the probability of dissolution. Sample size = 33463.  
 Any job loss Job loss by type Job loss by industry group 
     Declining Expanding 
Variables Exp(coef) (st.err.) Exp(coef) (st.err.) Exp(coef) (st.err.) Exp(coef) (st.err.) 
a) Models with one lag only 
Any job loss t-1 1.867*** (0.309)       
Redundancy t-1   1.389 (0.316) 2.177** (0.699) 1.070 (0.352) 
Temp job end t-1   2.126*** (0.524) 1.626 (0.828) 2.433*** (0.693) 
Dismissal t-1   2.537*** (0.911) 2.049 (1.499) 2.499** (1.112) 
Log pseudolikelihood  -2468.40 -2465.98 -2463.38 
No. of parameters 24 26 31 
b) Models with two lags 
Any job loss t-1 1.664*** (0.283)       
Any job loss t-2 1.522*** (0.242)       
Redundancy t-1   1.350 (0.303) 2.000** (0.632) 1.093 (0.363) 
Redundancy t-2   1.041 (0.242) 0.777 (0.284) 1.311 (0.438) 
Temp job end t-1   1.696* (0.427) 1.191 (0.628) 1.998** (0.587) 
Temp job end t-2   1.834* (0.444) 2.071* (0.859) 1.880** (0.588) 
Dismissal t-1   2.151* (0.885) 1.725 (1.315) 2.614* (1.330) 
Dismissal t-2   1.572 (0.612) 1.749 (1.063) 0.824 (0.549) 
Log pseudolikelihood  -2465.23 -2462.34 -2459.07 
No. of parameters 25 29 38 
 
Wald tests:  
    
H0: all job loss coeffs=0 
χ2(2)=20.48  
p-value=0.000 
χ2(6)=29.11  
p-value=0.000 
χ2(6)=13.91  
p-value=0.031 
χ2(6)=18.71  
p-value=0.005 
H0: t-1 job loss coeffs=0  
χ2(3)=9.54  
p-value=0.023 
χ2(3)=5.85  
p-value=0.119 
χ2(3)=8.88  
p-value=0.031 
H0: t-2 job loss coeffs=0  
χ2(3)=7.94  
p-value=0.047 
χ2(3)=5.83  
p-value=0.120 
χ2(3)=4.51  
p-value=0.212 
H0: redundancy coeffs=0  
χ2(2)=1.82  
p-value=0.403 
χ2(2)=5.06  
p-value=0.080 
χ2(2)=0.50  
p-value=0.779 
All regressions include the following variables: age of husband, age of wife, husband and wife’s education (3 dummies 
for each partner), wife’s employment status (one dummy), husband’s nonlabour income, wife’s nonlabour income, 
number of children present in household, dummy for difference in age of partners greater than 8, dummy for similar 
education level and 8 dummies for duration of marriage.  A constant is included. Models that distinguish between 
industry groups also include missing industry dummies interacted with redundancies (2 dummies) and temporary job 
endings (1 dummy); these are insignificant in all models. Regressions are cloglog models estimated in Stata. Standard 
errors are robust and clustered by couple.  * indicates that exp(coeff) is significantly different from 1 at 10% level, ** at 
5% and *** at 1%.  
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Table 4 – Effects of job loss on the probability of dissolution - random effects models.  
Sample size = 33463.  
 Job loss by type Job loss by industry group 
  Declining Expanding 
Variables Exp(coef) (st.err.) Exp(coef) (st.err.) Exp(coef) (st.err.) 
Redundancy t-1     1.353 (0.325)     1.931*** (0.661)     1.127 (0.404) 
Redundancy t-2     1.061 (0.256)     1.338 (0.447)     0.772 (0.300) 
Temp job end t-1     1.971** (0.567)     1.300 (0.768)     2.408*** (0.772) 
Temp job end t-2     1.811** (0.486)     2.095 (0.974)     1.866* (0.602) 
Dismissal t-1     2.080* (0.847)     1.807 (1.499)     2.489* (1.270) 
Dismissal t-2     1.875* (0.711)     1.966 (1.302)     1.003 (0.580) 
Mass pt 1: location, prob. -1.653, 0.972 -1.671, 0.971 
Mass pt 2: location, prob.  1.970, 0.027 1.904, 0.029 
Log likelihood  -2422.16 -2419.93 
No. of parameters 31 40 
All regressions include the following variables: age of husband, age of wife, husband and wife’s education (3 dummies 
for each partner), wife’s employment status (one dummy), husband’s nonlabour income, wife’s nonlabour income, 
number of children present in household, dummy for difference in age of partners greater than 8, dummy for similar 
education level and 8 dummies for duration of marriage.  A constant is not included. Models that distinguish between 
industry groups also include missing industry dummies interacted with redundancies (2 dummies) and temporary job 
endings (1 dummy); these are insignificant in all models. Models include random effects with discrete distributions 
containing 2 mass points. All models are estimated with gllamm routines written for Stata. Standard errors are robust 
and clustered by couple.  * indicates that exp(coeff) is significantly different from 1 at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 
1%. 
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Table 5 – Hazard models of the probability of dissolution- other regressors. Sample size = 33463. 
 One lag 
Job loss has  
two lags 
Two lags and 
industry groups 
Two lags, industry 
groups and 
random effects 
Variables Exp(coef) (st.err.) Exp(coef) (st.err.) Exp(coef) (st.err.) Exp(coef) (st.err.) 
Age:         
Husband 0.975 (0.016) 0.975 (0.016) 0.976 (0.016) 0.976 (0.016) 
Wife 0.947*** (0.016) 0.947*** (0.016) 0.947*** (0.016) 0.940*** (0.015) 
Education:         
Husband – HND/A 1.119 (0.192) 1.118 (0.192) 1.129 (0.194) 1.166 (0.211) 
Husband – CSE O 1.305 (0.239) 1.296 (0.238) 1.307 (0.239) 1.333 (0.260) 
Husband – No qual 0.995 (0.205) 0.993 (0.204) 1.005 (0.207) 1.000 (0.226) 
Wife – HND/A 1.151 (0.204) 1.160 (0.206) 1.144 (0.203) 1.133 (0.215) 
Wife – CSE O 1.257 (0.240) 1.264 (0.242) 1.243 (0.238) 1.172 (0.235) 
Wife – No qual 1.176 (0.273) 1.181 (0.274) 1.165 (0.271) 1.054 (0.255) 
Nonlabour  inc.:         
Husband 1.695 (0.703) 1.688 (0.707) 1.686 (0.703) 1.388 (1.246) 
Wife 4.852*** (2.258) 4.818*** (2.250) 4.858*** (2.263) 6.087*** (4.060) 
Wife employed 0.895 (0.100) 0.934 (0.110) 0.914 (0.103) 0.934 (0.110) 
Number of children 0.920 (0.048) 0.922 (0.048) 0.924 (0.049) 0.913 (0.051) 
Match quality:         
Age Diff > 8 yrs 1.470** (0.283) 1.474** (0.283) 1.464** (0.281) 1.606** (0.352) 
Same educ level 0.910 (0.086) 0.908 (0.086) 0.901 (0.086) 0.936 (0.101) 
Baseline hazard:         
Year 0 to 1 1.173 (0.179) 1.153 (0.175) 1.172 (0.178) 0.978 (0.170) 
Year 5 to 6 0.905 (0.145) 0.908 (0.145) 0.913 (0.146) 1.113 (0.187) 
Year 7 to 10 0.812 (0.128) 0.816 (0.129) 0.816 (0.129) 1.037 (0.180) 
Year 11 to 15 1.289 (0.203) 1.289 (0.203) 1.287 (0.204) 1.628*** (0.300) 
Year 16 to 20 1.446* (0.278) 1.442* (0.277) 1.435* (0.277) 1.791*** (0.399) 
Year 21 to 25 1.446 (0.333) 1.447 (0.333) 1.446 (0.333) 1.895 (0.494) 
Year 26 to 30 0.978 (0.333) 0.973 (0.331) 0.970 (0.330) 1.111 (0.387) 
Year 31 + 0.736 (0.295) 0.732 (0.293) 0.731 (0.293) 0.852 (0.349) 
Log pseudolikelihood  -2465.98 -2462.34 -2459.07 -2419.93 
No. of parameters 26 29 38 40 
Wald test of H0: 
baseline coeffs=0 
χ2(8)=16.18 
p-value=0.040 
χ2(8)= 15.76 
p-value=0.046 
χ2(8)=15.73  
p-value=0.046 
χ2(8)=15.90  
p-value=0.044 
All regressions include a constant (except for the model with random effects) and job loss variables by type of 
displacement. Results on job loss variables are presented in Table 3; the models can be matched by the value of the 
pseudolikelihood. Regressions without random effects are cloglog models estimated in Stata; unobserved 
heterogeneity is modelled as random effects discretely distributed with two mass points and this model is estimated 
with gllamm routines written for Stata.  Standard errors are robust and clustered by couple except for the random 
effects model.  * indicates that exp(coeff) is significantly different from 1 at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 1 - Variable definition - additional regressors. 
Husband’s age Years 
Wife’s age Years 
Difference in age 1 if the difference in age across partners >= 8 years 
Education: Degree 1 if the highest academic qualification is a university degree. This is the 
omitted category. 
                     HND/A 1 if the highest academic qualification is HND (including teaching 
qualification, nursing or other higher qualification) or GCE A level 
(upper high school graduate) 
                      O/CSE 1 if the highest academic qualification is GCE O level or CSE (lower high 
school graduate).  
                      No qualification 1 if highest qualification is less than high school 
Similarity in education 1 if partners have the same highest qualification 
Husband’s non labour income  In ‘000 £ (deflated using 2005 as base year). 
Wife’s non labour income  In ‘000 £ (deflated using 2005 as base year). 
Number of children  Number of dependent children in the household 
Wife’s employment 1 if the wife is in paid employment or self employed 
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1 We thank participants of the 2007 Australian Labour Market Research workshop and the 2008 Australian Conference 
of Economists for their suggestions and comments. Special thanks to two anonymous referees and associate editor 
Deborah Cobb-Clark for valuable comments and suggestions. The BHPS data was provided by the Economic and 
Social Research Council’s Data-Archive at the University of Essex and is used with permission. The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
2 Several studies of the effects of job displacements on earnings have used plant closures as exogenous displacements 
(see for example Gibbons and Katz, 1991 for the US and Doiron, 1995 for Canada). There is some dispute about the 
treatment of plant closures as exogenous (Schwerdt, 2007). In any case, information on plant closures is not available 
in the BHPS. 
3 The number of observations with displacements due to plant closures is not provided but the estimation results (some 
substantial quantitative effects with large standard errors) suggest that perhaps the number of such job losses is too 
small to yield sufficient precision in the estimates. 
4 Eliason uses propensity score matching to compare two samples of married individuals with one sample consisting of 
persons who have experienced a plant closure during the year 1987. Length of marriage is used as a matching variable 
but this variable only distinguishes between unions of less than 3 years. 
5 See also Eliason (2004) for a more detailed explanation of this model. 
6 A related strand of the literature considers the impact of earnings’ shocks generally on family consumption and 
production. See for example Browning and Crossley (2001) and Cullen and Gruber (2000). 
7 See Darity and Goldsmith (1996) for a review. 
8 Studies have also found negative impacts of unemployment on the well-being of spouses and children. Most of these 
papers are also found in other fields of study such as psychology and social sciences (see Strom, 2003; Voydanoff, 
1990 and Kalil and Ziol-Guest, 2007).  
9 Additional samples of 1,500 households in each of Scotland and Wales were added in 1999, and in 2001 a sample of 
2,000 households was added in Northern Ireland, making the panel suitable for UK-wide research. These samples are 
included in our analysis.  
10 In our main sample, 14% of observations consist of cohabitations. The modeling of the duration of the union 
distinguishing by type of union is not straightforward unless one assumes independent shocks (or competing risks) and 
although an interesting extension, it is left for future work. 
11 We would ideally like to know the date at which individuals felt their marriage end, regardless of the legal date of 
divorce or separation but this is not easily defined. 
12 Less than 25 couples. 
13 A sensitivity analysis is conducted by constructing a binary variable for couples who disappear from the survey and 
re-appear with a different marital status. This variable is introduced in our main models and does not affect the sign and 
significance of job loss variables. Results are available on request. 
14 Those couples where the man reaches 65 during the survey period are dropped at the time the man reaches 65 and 
treated as right-censored. We use age 65 as an exogenous censoring device. Due to the presence of mandatory 
retirement, the role of job displacements for workers older than 65 is likely to be quite different than for younger 
individuals.  
15 The proposed alternatives are: self employed, in-paid employment (full time or part time), unemployed, retired from 
paid work, on maternity leave, looking after family or home, full time student/at school, long term sick or disabled, on 
a government training scheme, something else.  
16 In our main sample, 72% of households report the husband as the individual with the largest labour income.  
17 See Borland et al. (1999). 
18 Previous research suggests that spousal labour income may be endogenous to job displacement so the wife’s labour 
income is not part of the main model.  
19 There is a limited incidence of repeated job loss of the same type in the same year mostly involving temporary job 
endings. Specifically, out of all observations with either a dismissal or redundancy (1480 couple - year), 106 or 7% 
have more than one occurrence of the job loss. Not surprisingly, the number is a lot higher for temporary job endings 
(21%). Sensitivity analysis is conducted with the addition of dummies for the observations with multiple occurrences 
and results are very similar to those reported below. Details are available from the authors.  
20 This assumption rules out right censoring rules that are correlated with unobservables and makes the use of self-
reported disability or early retirement as censoring variables problematic. In our sample, durations are right-censored 
when they reach the end date of the sample, when the husband’s age reaches 65 or due to attrition from the sample.  
21 With single spell data, it is very difficult to allow for correlations between the time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity and the covariates.The independence assumption which must be maintained with random effects has 
implications for the measurement of the impact of the job displacement variables. Specifically, in models with 
unobserved time-invariant random effects, any signal contained in a job loss variable must be independent of any initial 
unobserved match value. One can easily imagine violations of this assumption. A strong marriage may be harder to 
influence; hence the signalling effect of a dismissal may be lower for these couples. Again we stress that these results 
are used more as sensitivity analysis, in particular as a check on the specification of the baseline hazard. 
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22 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach. 
23 Adding a third lag reduces the sample to 27667 observations. 
24 The third lags on the displacement variables are also jointly insignificant; a Wald test yields a χ2(3) value of 1.60 
which corresponds to a p-value of 0.659. 
25 Charles and Stephens (2004) also found that the effects of job displacements were short run. In their specification, 
displacements in the previous 3 years were grouped and these had significant positive effects on the probability of 
divorce. There was no evidence of effects for those job losses that occurred in the previous 4 to 5 years. For job losses 
that occurred more than 5 years ago, a negative effect was found in the case of layoffs but no effects were detected for 
displacements due to plant closures. They interpret the long term effects from layoffs as an indication that the 
marriages involved survived a crisis and came out with a strengthened relationship. They also argue that the lack of 
effects in the medium term following a displacement can be perceived as evidence that the effects they do find (either 
from plant closures or layoffs) cannot be due to an omitted (time-invariant) variable. In the context of our paper, the 
omission of a time-invariant effect also cannot explain the effects of job displacements since results from the random 
effects model are virtually the same as those of the main model. 
26 We estimate models with three mass points but these did not converge easily; specifically, we had to omit the age 
variables and restrict the baseline hazard to get convergence. In all cases, the probability of the third mass point was 
between 0.011 and 0.012 and the results on the job loss variables were similar to those presented in Table 4 except for 
coefficients on the temporary job endings that became smaller and generally insignificant.  
27 We should add that results on education, nonlabour income and the wife’s employment status are sensitive to the 
treatment of the age variables. This is not surprising given the correlation in these variables. Since we do not care about 
these variables per se we choose the more flexible specification and include all regressors. 
28 Interactions with the baseline hazard were restricted to due to the short marriages in the flow sample. 
29 This was suggested by an anonymous referee. 
